Abstract. This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters-including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy. Here, in particular, the optimal strategies are determined considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Moreover, we list the conditions for convergence when both agents use their respective optimal strategies and study the effect of time on negotiation outcome.
Introduction
Automated negotiation is a key form of interaction in systems composed of autonomous agents [3] . Given its ubiquity, such negotiations exist in many different shapes and forms (see [7] for a taxonomy). Here, however, we consider a particular class of automated negotiation; namely, competitive bargaining over a single issue (price) between two agents that both have firm deadlines. This is exemplified by the e-commerce scenario in which a buyer agent and a seller agent negotiate over the price of a good or service. The buyer clearly prefers a low price, while the seller prefers a high one (hence the competitive nature of the encounter). In addition to attempting to obtain the best price, agents also usually need to ensure that negotiation ends before a certain deadline. However, the end point may not be the only way in which time influences negotiation behaviour. Consider the case in which the service is provided immediately after negotiation ends successfully (say at price P and time T). In some situations, it is not sufficient merely for an agent to ensure that T is any time less than its deadline. This may be the case, for instance, because one of the agents, say the buyer, could be losing utility with time as a result of not getting the service. On the other hand, the seller may perhaps gain more utility by providing the service as late as possible. Thus, in this case, the seller tries to maximize T (within the limit of its deadline) and the buyer tries to minimize T. In short, it is clear that agents can have different attitudes toward time.
Generally speaking, the most common time effects in bargaining situations are [6] :
-Discounting: Benefits received immediately by an agent are preferred to the same benefits received in the future. -Bargaining Cost: The bargaining process itself may incur some cost to an agent. -Sudden Termination: An agent may have a deadline beyond which it cannot continue negotiation.
In addition to time, the outcome of a negotiation typically depends on many other parameters; such as the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic cases it is not possible for agents to have complete information about all of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon to have partial information about some of them. For instance, an agent may have information about its opponent's preferences, or its deadline. In this paper, we focus on situations where an agent has the following information about its opponent 1 :
-A set of possible values for the opponent's reservation limit and a binary probability distribution over these values. -A set of possible values for the opponent's deadline and a binary probability distribution over these values.
With this information an agent can optimize its utility from price and time. However we do not assume that agents have full information about the preferences of their opponent or the strategy that they use. It is known (common knowledge) that both agents use a strategy that varies their negotiation stance with time, but the particular type of time dependent strategy that an agent uses is not known to its opponent. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit the available information to select a strategy that maximises its expected utility. Moreover, when both agents have this information about one another, we determine the impact of this information on the outcome of negotiation. This analysis is important because it enables us to construct software agents that will optimally negotiate on behalf of users given their state of knowledge in a given context.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following manner. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes the basics of our negotiation model. Section 4 determines the optimal strategies for agents with incomplete information about each other. In section 5 we analyze the outcome of negotiation when both agents use their respective optimal strategies. Finally, in section 6 we present the conclusions and outline some avenues for future work.
Related Work
Game theoretic research typically deals with coordination and negotiation issues by assuming that agents have complete information about each other and then giving pre-computed solutions to specific problems [10] . However this perfect information assumption is limiting because uncertainty is endemic in most realistic applications. Harsanyi et al [2] give a generalized solution for two person bargaining games with incomplete information. However there is no notion of timing issues in their model. Another important model of strategic bargaining is the infinite horizon alternating offer game [11] . Since this has a unique solution, where agents agree on a split immediately, it has been applied to automated negotiation [5] . However while this model takes time into consideration, it again assumes perfect information. Faratin et al.'s negotiation framework [1] models time as agents' deadlines and is not based on the assumption that agents have perfect information. However in this model the agent's utility functions depend only on negotiation issues like price and quality, but are independent of time.
Perhaps the work that is most closely related to ours is that of Sandholm and Vulkan [12] . In their work on bargaining with deadlines, they consider the probability distribution over agent deadlines to be common knowledge. Specifically, they address the problem of splitting the price-surplus which is known to both agents. They show that the optimal strategy is one in which agents wait until the first deadline, at which point one agent concedes everything to the other. Thus agents only ever make two offers, they either demand the entire surplus or no surplus at all. This gives the entire surplus of price to the agent with the longer deadline. But because of the offers made by agents, the deadline effect completely overrides time discounting: an agent's payoff does not change with its discounting factor. In contrast, in our work we take a binary probability distribution over agent deadlines, but we consider this to be private knowledge. In addition to this, we also take a binary probability distribution over the price-surplus. But the agents do not know their opponent's bargaining cost or discounting factor. Our optimal strategies too give the entire surplus of price to the agent with the longer deadline. However because of the difference in initial offers, our results bring out the difference between the effect of deadlines and time discounting. That is, the deadline effect on payoffs to agents does not suppress the effect of time discounting.
The Negotiation Model
We use an alternating offers negotiation protocol for our study. Let , it rates the offer using its utility function
@ )
. Given the fact that both agents have (different) deadlines, we assume that both agents use a strategy that varies their negotiation behaviour with respect to the passage of time. Thus, time is the predominant factor used to decide which value to offer in the next negotiation move. Here such strategies are called time-dependent (from [1] ). Before determining the optimal strategies (in section 4), we briefly introduce the different types of time dependent strategies that we consider. These strategies vary the value of price depending on the remaining negotiation time, modeled as the above defined constant 
Optimal Negotiation Strategies
An agent's negotiation strategy defines the sequence of actions it takes during the course of negotiation. In our case, this equates to determining the value of a counter-offer which, in turn, depends on the counter-offer vector V. The information that an agent has about the negotiation parameters is called its negotiation environment. In order to determine an optimal strategy an agent needs to find values for V, on the basis of its negotiation environment, that maximize its utility. Since an agent's utility depends on two parameters, price and time (see section 3), it determines the optimal price and the optimal time g for reaching an agreement. An optimal strategy thus makes counteroffers that result in the negotiation outcome (¨ g ) .
Negotiation Environments
We model the negotiation environment 0 2
for an agent
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denotes the buyer's utility which is a function of price and time that decreases with price and either increases or decreases with time.
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represent the information that ¦ has about § . This is the agent's private information. Our aim is to determine optimal strategies for agents by considering all possible ways in which time can effect negotiation. Thus depending on the type of utility function The environment for the seller can be defined analogously. 
Negotiation Strategies
We formally define an agent's strategy denotes the corresponding optimal strategy. The optimal strategies are determined for each of the above six environments. An optimal strategy should result in agreement at the optimal price and at the optimal time. An agent's preference for price is independent of time, i.e., the buyer always prefers a low price and the seller always prefers a high price . We therefore determine the optimal strategy assuming ) U (section 4.3). This gives the optimal time for reaching agreement. Then for this optimal time we find the strategy that gives the optimal price by taking the actual value of )
. This is explained in section 4.4. The resulting strategy is therefore optimal in both time and price.
Optimal Strategies in Particular Environments when v
This section details the optimal strategy for each of the environments noted above. The analysis is from the perspective of the buyer, although strategies for the seller can be defined analogously. , from strategy § 2
. On the other hand, if ) ¡
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. In our experiments we computed the expected utility for 
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. The results of our experiments (for the same values of all other variables as in environment 1) are shown in Fig. 4 
In the remaining three environments ¦ ' s utility decreases with time, and it can maximize its utility by using a strategy that ends negotiation as early as possible.
and the buyer maximizes its utility by minimizing price by conceding only up to) since it knows from its environment that § is shown in Fig. 5B .
. In this environment ¦ ' s best strategy 2 is to concede up toÄ2 at the beginning of negotiation since
for all values of g and the counter-offers areÑ2 throughout negotiation.
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The above strategies give an optimal value for
an optimal value for price needs to be determined. There are two possible values for the seller's reservation limit,) with probability ) and get an n 9 2
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. The results of this experiment are as shown in Fig. 7 . . As we increased
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Negotiation Outcomes
We now determine the outcome of negotiation when both agents use their respective optimal strategies as determined in table 1. Since the buyer and seller could either gain or lose utility with time, we have the following four possibilities:
Ý Ü Þ denotes the optimal value for the seller's reservation price)
We consider the case where 8A ). This corresponds to ae )
for the seller and its optimal strategy is )
. , and the outcome of negotiation becomes S¨ n ) g i ) T
. On the other hand, if g n ) ¡ is § ' s actual deadline (see Fig. 8B ), it corresponds to A )
. For the buyer it is A 2 and its optimal strategy is 2 be the seller's actual deadline (see Fig. 8 G) . This corresponds to )
. If ), and the entire surplus goes to § . In the same way the outcome of negotiation, if both agents use the optimal strategies as determined in section 3, can be found for all the remaining cases. These results are summarized in table 2. g f ì d enotes the beginning of negotiation.
As seen from table 2, the negotiation outcome remains the same in the first three cases, i.e., when both agents gain utility with time, or when any one of them gains and the other loses with time. This happens because the agent that gains utility with time delays in making an offer that is acceptable to the opponent till the earliest deadline is reached. When both agents lose utility with time, they make the maximum required concession at the earliest opportunity, i.e. the start of negotiation. Agreement is therefore reached at the beginning of negotiation. Similarly the optimal value for price depends on the value of )
Conditions for convergence of optimal strategies
. For instance, for the buyer, the optimal price ism) 
Conclusions
This paper determined what the optimal negotiation strategies are for agents that find themselves in environments with different information states. Specifically, we considered situations where agents have uncertain information about two negotiation parameters (the opponent's deadline and reservation limit) but do not have any information about their opponent's bargaining cost, discounting factor or strategy. We listed conditions for convergence of these optimal strategies and studied the effect of time on the negotiation outcome. In the future we intend to extend our analysis to determine if this mutual strategic behavior leads to equilibria and then analyze situations where agents have limited information about other negotiation parameters like the opponent's bargaining cost, its discounting factor or its strategy to compare their relative influences on the negotiation outcome.
